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Motivated by the literature on random choice and in particular the random utility models, 
we extend the analysis in Bossert and Sprumont (2013) to include the possibility that 
players exhibit stochastic preferences over alternatives. We prove that every random choice 
rule is backwards-induction rationalizable.
© 2017 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Bossert and Sprumont (2013) deﬁne a choice function as backwards-induction rationalizable “if there exists a ﬁnite 
perfect-information extensive-form game such that for each subset of alternatives, the backwards-induction outcome of the 
restriction of the game to that subset of alternatives coincides with the choice from that subset.” Bossert and Sprumont
(2013) then prove that every choice function is backwards-induction rationalizable. They focus on games where all players 
have strict preferences over the alternatives.
It is well known that individual choices exhibit variability, in both experimental and market settings; see for example, 
Sippel (1997), McFadden (2001), and Manzini et al. (2010). The theoretical literature on random choice has focused largely 
on interpreting random choice as random utility maximization.1 Motivated by the literature on random choice and in 
particular the random utility models (Block and Marschak, 1960), we extend the analysis in Bossert and Sprumont (2013)
to include the possibility that players exhibit stochastic preferences over alternatives.
In a collective decision-making setting, if some player has a stochastic preference, then not surprisingly, the collective 
actions of the players might lead to a random outcome. We study the testable aspects of collective decision-making, allowing 
✩ We are grateful to the Editor and anonymous referees for the comments and suggestions. We are indebted to John Quah for his continuous and 
invaluable encouragement, support, and guidance. We thank Yi-Chun Chen, Xiao Luo, Siyang Xiong, and Satoru Takahashi for helpful discussions. All 
remaining errors are our own.
* Corresponding author.
E-mail addresses: jasonli1017@gmail.com (J. Li), rui.tang@u.nus.edu (R. Tang).
1 A random utility model is described by a probability measure over preference orderings, and the player selects the maximal alternative available 
according to the randomly assigned preference ordering; see for example, the seminal work of Block and Marschak (1960).
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for stochastic preferences of the players. We extend the Bossert–Sprumont theorem, and prove that every random choice rule 
is backwards-induction rationalizable via stochastic preferences.
This note contributes to the emerging literature that applies the revealed preference approach to the study of collective 
decisions. Yanovskaya (1980), Sprumont (2000) and Galambos (2005) consider choice correspondences and Nash equilibria of 
normal-form games. Ray and Zhou (2001) and Ray and Snyder (2013) study Nash equilibria and sub-game perfect equilibria 
on extensive-form games. Xu and Zhou (2007) and Bossert and Sprumont (2013) examine when choice functions can be 
rationalized by an extensive-form game. Rehbeck (2014) and Xiong (2014) extend the Bossert–Sprumont theorem, and prove 
that every choice correspondence is backwards-induction rationalizable via weak preferences. In particular, the construction 
of the extensive-form game hinges upon a player who exhibits complete indifference among all alternatives.
2. Deﬁnitions
Let X be a given ﬁnite universal set of alternatives, and denote by P(X) the collection of all nonempty subsets of X . The 
elements of P(X) are viewed as feasible sets that the players collectively choose an alternative from. We use A, B, C, . . . to 
denote alternative sets, and x, y, z, . . . to denote alternatives. Throughout the rest of the paper, unless it leads to confusion, 
we abuse the notation by suppressing the set delimiters, e.g., writing x rather than {x}. We use the following notational 
convention: xy := x ∪ y.
A choice function is a map f : P(X) → X such that f (A) ∈ A for all A ∈ P(X). A random choice rule is a map ρ : X ×
P(X) → [0, 1] such that for all A ∈P(X), we have i) ∑x∈A ρ(x, A) = 1; and ii) ρ(x, A) = 0 for all x /∈ A. The interpretation 
is that ρ(x, A) denotes the probability that alternative x is chosen when the possible alternatives faced by the players are 
the alternatives in A.
In what follows, we present the relevant deﬁnitions and notations. Whenever possible, we keep the notations consistent 
with Bossert and Sprumont (2013) and Rehbeck (2014). We suggest that readers familiar with these two papers skip this 
section and return to it as needed.
Preference ordering. A preference ordering is a reﬂexive, complete, transitive and antisymmetric binary relation. We denote 
by RA the set of all preference orderings on A ∈P(X).
Precedence relation. Let ≺ be a transitive and asymmetric binary relation on a nonempty and ﬁnite set N . We say that 
n ∈ N is a direct predecessor of n′ ∈ N if n ≺ n′ and there is no n′′ ∈ N such that n ≺ n′′ ≺ n′ . Similarly, we say that n ∈ N is 
a direct successor of n′ ∈ N if n′ ≺ n and there is no n′′ ∈ N such that n′ ≺ n′′ ≺ n. The set of direct predecessors of n ∈ N is 
denoted by P (n). The set of direct successors of n ∈ N is denoted by S(n).
Tree. A tree  is given by a quadruple (0, D, T , ≺), where the variables are deﬁned as follows:
(i) the notation 0 is the root;
(ii) the variable D is a ﬁnite set of decision nodes such that 0 ∈ D;
(iii) the variable T is a nonempty and ﬁnite set of terminal nodes such that D ∩ T = ∅;
(iv) the notation ≺ is a transitive and asymmetric precedence relation on the set of all nodes N = D ∪ T such that:
(a) P (0) = ∅, and |S(0)| ≥ 1;
(b) for all n ∈ D \ {0}, |P (n)| = 1, and |S(n)| ≥ 1;
(c) for all n ∈ T , |P (n)| = 1, and S(n) = ∅.
Path. A path in  from a decision node n ∈ D to a terminal node n′ ∈ T (of length K ∈ N) is an ordered (K + 1) tuple 
(n0, n1, . . . , nK ) ∈ N |K+1| such that n0 = n, {nk−1} = P (nk) for all k ∈ {1, 2, . . . , K }, and nK = n′ .
Game. A game is a triple G = (, g, π) where
(i)  = (0, D, T , ≺) is a tree;
(ii) g : T → X is an outcome function that maps each terminal node n ∈ T to an alternative g(n) ∈ X ;
(iii) π is a probability measure over the space of preference assignment maps, where each preference assignment map R :
D →RX speciﬁes for each decision node n ∈ D a preference ordering R(n) ∈RX . We denote by RD,X the space of 
all such preference assignment maps, and denote by RD,X the set of all probability measures over RD,X . Formally, 
π ∈ RD,X .
We focus on games in which the uncertainty on R resolves before any player makes a move, and the realization of R is 
commonly known among all the players. Let δR denote the degenerate measure at the preference assignment map R . For 
simplicity, sometimes we write G = (, g, R) rather than G = (, g, δR).
Restriction of game. Fix a game G = (, g, π), we deﬁne the restriction of game G on A ∈P(X) as G|A = GA = (A, gA, πA), 
where
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(i) 0A = 0;
(ii) DA = {n ∈ D : there exists n′ ∈ g−1(A) and a path in  from n to n′};
(iii) T A = g−1(A);
(iv) ≺A is the restriction of ≺ to NA = DA ∪ T A ;
(iv) gA is the restriction of g to T A ;
(v) πA ∈ RDA ,A is the induced probability measure from π ∈ RD,X . For any RA ∈ RDA ,A , πA({RA}) = π({R ∈ RD,X :
RA is the restriction of R to DA and A}).
For any R ∈RD,X , we denote by RA the restriction of R to DA and A.
Solution concept. Denote by max(A; R∗) the unique best alternative in A ∈ P(X) according to the preference ordering 
R∗ ∈RX . Similarly, denote by min(A; R∗) the unique worst alternative in A ∈ P(X) according to the preference ordering 
R∗ ∈RX . Consider the game G = (, g, R). For each decision node n ∈ D , we denote by en(, g, R) the backwards-induction 
outcome of the subgame of G = (, g, R) rooted at n. We deﬁne the backwards-induction solution at node n as en(, g, R)
in the usual way: ﬁrst set en(, g, R) = g(n) for all n ∈ T , and then recursively set en(, g, R) = max({en′(, g, R) : n′ ∈
S(n)}; R(n)) for all n ∈ D . We write e(, g, R) = e0(, g, R).
Backwards-induction rationalizable. A choice function f is backwards-induction rationalizable if there is a game G =
(, g, R) such that
e(A, gA, RA) = f (A)
for any A ∈ P(X). We say that G is a backwards-induction rationalization of f or that G backwards-induction rationalizes f . 
A random choice rule ρ is backwards-induction rationalizable if there is a game G = (, g, π) such that
π({R ∈RD,X : e(A, gA, RA) = x}) = ρ(x, A)
for any x ∈ A ∈P(X). We say that G is a backwards-induction rationalization of ρ or that G backwards-induction rationalizes ρ .
3. Result
We prove that every random choice rule is backwards-induction rationalizable.
Theorem 1. Every random choice rule is backwards-induction rationalizable.
Proof. Without loss of generality, we assume that |X | ≥ 2. For any given random choice rule ρ , we construct the tree  =
(0, D, T , ≺), the allocation function g : T → X , and the probability measure π ∈ RD,X , such that the game G = (, g, π)
backwards-induction rationalizes ρ . Let P¯(X) = {A ∈P(X) : |A| ≥ 2}.
Step 1. Building blocks.
Fix an arbitrary preference ordering R∗ ∈ RX . By Bossert and Sprumont (2013, Theorem 1), every choice function is 
backwards-induction rationalizable. Consequently, for any A ∈ P¯(X) and x ∈ A, there exists a game GA,x = (A,x, gA,x, RA,x)
where A,x = (nA,x, DA,x, T A,x, ≺A,x) such that
e(GA,x|B) =
{
x; if B = A;
min(B; R∗); if B = A. (1)
Note that nA,x is the root of the tree A,x .
Step 2. Construction of the tree  = (0, D, T , ≺).
(i) 0 is the root of the tree;
(ii) let S(0) = {nA}A∈P¯(X) . Clearly, |S(0)| = |P¯(X)|;
(iii) let S(nA) = {nA,x}x∈A for each A ∈ P¯(X). Clearly, |S(nA)| = |A|;
(iv) the set of decision nodes D is given by the union of {0}, S(0), and the set of decision nodes DA,x of game GA,x for each 
A ∈ P¯(X) and x ∈ A;
(v) the set of terminal nodes T is given by the union of the set of terminal nodes T A,x of game GA,x for each A ∈ P¯(X)
and x ∈ A;
(vi) the restriction of ≺ to DA,x coincides with ≺A,x .
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Fig. 1. The tree when X = {x, y, z}.
Fig. 1 depicts the tree when there are three alternatives; that is, X = {x, y, z}.
Step 3. Construction of the outcome function g.
For any n ∈ T , we have that n ∈ T A,x for some T A,x . The outcome function g is deﬁned such that g(n) = gA,x(n).
Step 4. Construction of the probability measure π ∈ RD,X .
We construct π ∈ RD,X such that:
(i) for the root 0, π({R ∈RD,X : R(0) = R∗}) = 1;
(ii) for all n ∈ DA,x , π({R ∈RD,X : R(n) = RA,x(n)}) = 1;
(iii) for all x ∈ X and A ∈ P¯(X), π({R ∈RD,X : max(A; R(nA)) = x}) = ρ(x, A).
The three conditions are restrictions imposed on the marginal distributions of π , and it is easy to see that such π exists.
Step 5. Backwards-induction rationalizable.
Lastly, we verify that π({R ∈RD,X : e(A, gA, RA) = x}) = ρ(x, A) for any x ∈ A ∈ P(X). We omit the trivial case when 
the feasible set is a singleton.
Fix A ∈ P¯(X). For any preference ordering R ∈RD,X in the support of π ∈ RD,X , it follows from (1) that
enA,x(A, gA, RA) = x;
for any x ∈ A, and
enB,y (A, gA, RA) =min(A; R∗)
for any B ∈ P¯(X)\{A} and y ∈ B .
Therefore,
enA (A, gA, RA) =max(A; R(nA));
and
enB (A, gA, RA) =min(A; R∗)
for any B ∈ P¯(X)\{A}.
By the construction in Step 4, R(0) = R∗ . Hence,
e(A, gA, RA) =max(A; R(nA)). (2)
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Lastly,
ρ(x, A) = π({R ∈RD,X : max(A; R(nA)) = x})
= π({R ∈RD,X : e(A, gA, RA) = x}),
where the ﬁrst equality follows from the construction in Step 4, and the second equality follows from (2). 
Remark 1. We prove a stronger version of the Bossert–Sprumont theorem. Fix the alternative set X . Bossert and Sprumont
(2013) show that, for any choice function f , there exists a tree  = (0, D, T , ≺), an outcome function g : T → X and 
a preference assignment map R : D → RX such that G = (, g, R) backwards-induction rationalizes f . In contrast, we 
construct the tree ′ = (0′, D ′, T ′, ≺′) and outcome function g′ : T ′ → X such that for any choice function f , there exists a 
preference assignment map R ′ : D ′ →RX such that G ′ = (′, g′, R ′) is a backwards-induction rationalization of f . In fact, 
the space of random choice rules deﬁned on X is a mixture space,2 and each random choice rule could be decomposed into 
a convex combination of choice functions. The randomness of collective choice behavior could be completely accounted by 
the stochastic preferences of the players, as proved in our theorem.
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